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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have long recognized a general common law right of ac-
cess to courtroom proceedings' and court records.2 Recently, how-
ever, courts have begun to consider whether the first amendment
of the Constitution3 protects this right of access. In 1980 the
United States Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia4 held that the press and the public have a first amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials.5 The Supreme Court found
this right implicit in the various clauses of the first amendment.'
Although the Supreme Court has taken few opportunities
since Richmond Newspapers to define precisely the contours of the
first amendment right of access,7 the United States Courts of Ap-
peals have expressed a willingness to extend this right beyond its
application to the criminal courtroom. One circuit has expressly
concluded that the first amendment protects the right of access to
criminal court records." Circuit courts also have held that the first
amendment protects the public's right to attend civil trials.9 More
recently, several circuits have extended first amendment protec-
tions even further to cover the right of access to civil court
records.' 0
1. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-07 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
2. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 & n.8 (1978). See gen-
erally Annotation, Restricting Public Access to Judicial Records of State Courts, 84
A.L.R.3d 598 (1978); Annotation, Restricting Access to Judicial Records, 175 A.L.R. 1260
(1948) (discussing cases concerning access to judicial records).
3. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom ... of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
5. Id. at 580; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(same holding in rape trial). For a discussion of both cases, see infra notes 56-83 and accom-
panying text.
6. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
7. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 54 U.S.L.W. 4869 (U.S. June 30, 1986)
(extending first amendment right of access to criminal preliminary hearing); Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511-13 (1984) (extending first amendment right of
access to voir dire examination of jurors); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33-34
(1984) (denying existence of first amendment right to disseminate information gained
through pretrial discovery).
8. Associated Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of
Associated Press, see infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
9. See Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
10. Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Continen-
tal Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). But see In re
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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This Recent Development considers whether the first amend-
ment grants to the press and the public a right of access to civil
court records. Part II examines the cases that led to the current
debate over the constitutional right to inspect and copy civil court
records. Part III discusses the five recent circuit court opinions
that have considered whether the press and the public have a first
amendment right of access to civil court records. Part IV argues
that this recent trend adopted by the majority of circuit court
opinions is inappropriate in light of current constitutional theory.
Finally, Part V suggests a common law balancing approach for
courts to apply when considering access questions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The right to inspect and copy judicial records is an ancient
doctrine under English common law.11 In England the common law
allows both a person who has a proprietary interest in a document
and a person who needs a document as evidence to enforce a right
of access in court.'2 In the United States the right of access to judi-
cial records is even broader." American courts have interpreted
the common law as allowing all citizens the right of access to judi-
cial records."" This right stems from the conviction that all persons
should be able to view the government in operation and to learn
how it functions. 15 Despite this accepted doctrine, however, few
courts have had the opportunity to examine and define the scope
11. As early as 1372 the English Parliament enacted laws governing the right of access
to court records. 46 Edw. 3 (1372), reprinted in 2 ENGLISH STATUTES AT LARGE 191, 196-97
(1341-1411). See generally Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial
Records: In camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659, 660-66 (1982) (discussing the history
of the English common law concerning judicial records).
12. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Pigott, 131 Eng. Rep. 155 (C.P. 1831); Browne v. Cummings,
109 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1829).
13. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 471-73 (Boston 1842).
See generally Note, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right to View Judicial
Proceedings and Records, 52 Tmp. L.Q. 311, 337-43 (1979) (discussing the history of the
American common law concerning judicial records); Note, supra note 11, at 666-72 (same).
14. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); Ex parte
Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915); Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404 (1894).
15. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-98. Justice Holmes remarked in Crowley
v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884):
It is desirable that the trial[s] ... should take place under the public eye, not because
the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of
the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the
sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself
with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.
Id. at 394; see also Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. at 407-08.
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and characteristics of this common law right of access to judicial
records. This part of the Recent Development examines the cases
that set the stage for the current discussion of whether the press
and the general public have a right of access to court records and,
if so, whether that right is of constitutional magnitude.
A. Warner Communications and Progeny: Common Law Right
of Access to Criminal Court Records
In the early 1980s several United States Courts of Appeals,
spurred by an important Supreme Court decision,16 began to con-
sider whether the press and the general public have a common law
right to inspect and copy judicial records in criminal trials.17 The
courts split on the question. A number of the circuits concluded
that trial courts should deny the press and public the right of ac-
cess to court records only in exceptional circumstances. 8 Another
circuit, giving great discretion to the trial judge, viewed the com-
mon law presumption of access as just one factor of many that a
trial court should consider in resolving the matter.1
In Nixon v. Warner Communications0 the Supreme Court ex-
amined the media's right to copy audiotapes that the prosecution
had introduced into evidence during public proceedings of the
Watergate trial.2' Although deciding against the media on the basis
16. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
17. See United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982); Belo Broadcasting
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (referred to by commentators as "the Jenrette case"). United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. Criden, 648 F.2d at 823; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952; National Broadcasting Co., 653
F.2d at 613.
19. Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 430.
20. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
21. Id. at 591. The Watergate trial concerned the prosecution of four former presiden-
tial aides for conspiring to obstruct justice by concealing the identities of individuals
responsible for the Watergate break-in. During the trial, the special prosecutor publicly in-
troduced into evidence edited tape recordings of the President's conversations. Numerous
parties, including three national television networks, requested access to the tapes to inspect
and copy the contents. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978). In Warner Communications, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia had refused to allow the requested access, fearing the prejudicial impact that the
broadcast of the tapes might have on the defendants' ability to obtain a fair trial. United
States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir.
1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589 (1978). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court
alluded to the possibility of a constitutional right of access to the requested material. Id. at
1468
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of a federal statute that specified the time and procedure for re-
lease of the Watergate tapes,22 the majority discussed the common
law sources of the presumption of access to judicial records.2 3 The
Court acknowledged the existence of a general common law right
to inspect and copy judicial records.24 The Court found support for
this right in the public's desire to monitor the judicial process 25
and in the public's need for information about the operation of
government.2'6 The Court noted, however, that this general right of
access was not absolute. For example, the Court would not allow
the use of judicial records either to satisfy "private spite or [to]
promote public scandal ' 28 or as a "source of business information
that might harm a litigant's competitive standing. ' 29 Finally, the
Court indicated that the decision whether to allow access to judi-
cial records generally is best left to the sound discretion of the trial
judge"° because of his ability to weigh all the relevant factors in
light of the facts of a particular case.31
Addressing the constitutional issues, the Court rejected the ar-
gument that the first amendment requires that the media be al-
1263 n.52, quoted in Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 596. (The "court's power to
control the uses to which the tapes are put once released... is sharply limited by the First
Amendment.") (emphasis in original). The court, however, relied on the common law
presumption in favor of public access to judicial records to hold that the broadcasters had a
right to copy the audiotapes. Id. at 1260-63; see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 596.
22. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 603-08 (citing Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (note following 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (1982)).
23. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-99.
24. Id. at 597. For example, the Court stated that the District of Columbia has recog-
nized a right of access to judicial records since 1894. Id. at 597 n.8; see Ex parte Drawbaugh,
2 App. D.C. 404 (1894).
25. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598 (citing State ex rel. Colscott v. King,
154 Ind. 621, 621-27, 57 N.E. 535, 536-38 (1900); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L.
332, 336-39 (N.J. 1879)).
26. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598 (citing State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens,
28 Wis. 2d 672, 677, 137 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1965), modified on other grounds, 28 Wis. 2d
685a, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1966) (per curiam)).
27. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598.
28. Id. The Court used as an example "the painful and sometimes disgusting details of
a divorce case." Id. (quoting In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 836, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893), and citing
King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 P. 730 (1917)). The Court also noted that courts have
refused to "permit their files to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consump-
tion." Id. (citing Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 395 (1884) (per Holmes, J.)).
29. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598 (citing Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1,
5-6, 48 N.W. 201, 202 (1891)).
30. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 599.
31. Id.; cf. State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682, 137 N.W.2d 470, 474-
75 (1965), modified on other grounds, 28 Wis. 2d 685a, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1966) (per curiam).
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lowed to inspect and copy the Watergate tapes.32 The Court found
that the press did not have a constitutional right superior to that
of the public, who in this instance had not been given physical ac-
cess to the tapes.3 According to the majority, the Court satisfied
the media's first amendment rights by allowing the press to attend
the trial, listen to the tapes, and read the transcripts - the same
degree of access available to the public.3 4
Because the Supreme Court based its decision in Warner
Communications on a federal statute, the Court did not examine
fully the scope of the common law right to inspect and copy court
records in criminal trials. Consequently, subsequent judicial con-
siderations of whether to allow public access to court records have
resulted in inconsistent rationales and holdings. Three federal cir-
cuits have upheld claims of a common law right to inspect and
copy evidentiary material in criminal trials. In United States v.
Myers3 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed a district court decision allowing the general public access
to the Abscam videotapes 8 shown at the trial.3 7 The court recog-
nized a strong presumption in favor of public access.38 According
to the Second Circuit, "only the most compelling circumstances
should prevent contemporaneous public access to [judicial
records]."
In United States v. Jenrette40 and United States v. Criden4'
32. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608 ("Respondents argue that release of the
tapes is required by both the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press and the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial. Neither supports respondents' conclusion.").
Courts are not in complete agreement on this conclusion. For an alternative interpretation
of the Supreme Court's holding, see infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
33. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609; see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the first amendment prohibited state action designed to
prevent the publication of the names of rape victims when official court records already had
placed the information in the public domain).
34. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609.
35. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Abscam was an F.B.I. operation designed to expose certain government officials
who were accepting bribes. The F.B.I. recorded the "sting" operations on videotape and
submitted the incriminating information as evidence during the trial proceedings. National
television networks requested the right to inspect and copy the tapes for broadcast to the
public. See Myers, 635 F.2d at 947-49, for a complete history of the case.
37. Id. at 947.
38. Id. at 949-50. Because this case concerned exclusively the scope of the common law
right to inspect and copy court records, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinion in United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589.
39. Myers, 632 F.2d at 952.
40. 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit and the Third Circuit reversed lower court decisions that
had denied broadcasters the right to copy Abscam videotapes. In
Jenrette the D.C. Circuit indicated that a district court should
deny public access only if, after weighing the interests of the par-
ties and the public, the court concludes that "justice so requires.' 42
In Criden the Third Circuit undertook its own analysis of the par-
ties' interests, giving little deference to the discretion exercised by
the trial court.43
In contrast to the three Abscam cases, in Belo Broadcasting
Corp. v. Clark44 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a lower court decision denying the media the right
to inspect and copy audiotapes that the prosecution had used as
evidence in the Brilab trial.4 5 The Fifth Circuit diverged from the
D.C., Second, and Third Circuit decisions for two reasons. First,
the court found no language in the Supreme Court's Warner Com-
munications opinion to justify the D.C. Circuit's and the Second
Circuit's strong presumption in favor of public access.4" The Fifth
Circuit held that the presumption in favor of access to criminal
court records should be only one of several factors courts should
consider when examining the media's interests.47 Second, the Fifth
Circuit noted that an appellate court may reverse a trial court's
conclusions of law only for abuse of discretion.48 Unlike the Third
Circuit in Criden, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the trial court
41. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
42. Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 613 (citing Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1260).
43. Criden, 648 F.2d at 818. The Third Circuit undertook a de novo evaluation of the
competing values of the parties. The court concluded that the trial court could have used a
less drastic measure than denial of access. Id. at 829; see also United States v. Martin, 746
F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1984). In Martin, the Third Circuit held that the press had a common law
right of access to transcripts of tape recordings that the jury had used in a criminal trial.
Although the transcripts were never submitted into evidence, the court concluded that the
strong presumption in favor of access applied to all "judicial records and documents." Id. at
968.
44. 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 425. The Brilab trial concerned an F.B.I. "sting" operation that led to the
indictment of the speaker of the Texas House of Representatives and three other
individuals for alleged bribery. Audiotapes of various transactions implicating the defend-
ants were submitted at public trial as evidence. Two Dallas broadcasting stations requested
access to the tapes. Id.
46. Id. at 433-34.
47. Id. at 434.
48. Id. at 430-33. The Fifth Circuit read the Warner Communications decision as
holding that only the most egregious abuse of discretion by the trial court could merit rever-
sal. Id. at 430-431; see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 613-14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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has supervisory power over its own records and has freedom to
make a sound choice based on all relevant factors. 9 In sum, the
Fifth Circuit was concerned that the other circuits were creating a
presumption of constitutional, rather than of common law,
proportion.5 0
Finally, in United States v. Edwards51 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a lower court de-
cision that denied reporters access to audiotapes used in a public
trial.52 The Seventh Circuit, however, did not adopt the Fifth Cir-
cuit's rationale in Belo Broadcasting. Rather, after 6valuating the
earlier decisions, the court adopted a strong presumption in favor
of public access to this type of evidentiary material.53 Nevertheless,
the court acknowledged that this presumption was not absolute3 '
and in this instance the Seventh Circuit gave considerable defer-
ence to the trial court's judgment that public access would affect
adversely the defendant's pending second trial.55
B. Richmond Newspapers and Progeny: First Amendment
Right of Access to Criminal Court Proceedings
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia56 the Supreme
Court held that the press and the public have a first amendment
49. Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 430.
50. Id. at 434.
51. 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 1290, 1296. The case concerned charges that the president pro tempore of
the Indiana Senate accepted money from a private businessman in exchange for legislative
favors. Law enforcement agents had recorded a telephone conversation between the two
defendants and had presented this recording as evidence at trial. Id. at 1290-91.
53. Id. at 1290. The Seventh Circuit, however, noted that it did not consider the pre-
sumption in favor of access to be as strong as the Second Circuit had claimed. Id. at 1294.
54. Id. at 1294.
55. Id. at 1295.
56. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Richmond Newspapers began with the trial of John Steven-
son for the murder of a hotel manager. Facing his fourth trial for the same charge, the
defendant moved to close the courtroom from the public to insure that witnesses and jurors
would not receive information about the trial from outside sources. Id. at 559-63. The prose-
cutor raised no objection and the trial court granted the motion without a hearing. Id. The
trial judge based the authority to close the proceeding on a Virginia statute. The statute
gave the court discretion to exclude any party whose presence might hinder the possibility
of a fair trial, as long as the court did not violate the defendant's right to a public trial.
VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1983); see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560.
Two reporters for Richmond Newspapers moved for a hearing to vacate the closure
order. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560. The trial court denied the motion based on
its desire to guarantee a fair trial for the defendant. Id. at 561. The trial continued in se-
crecy and the defendant was acquitted. The Virginia Supreme Court, finding no reversible
error, denied Richmond Newspapers'petitions for mandamus, prohibition, and leave to ap-
1472
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right to attend criminal trials.57 Although the Court addressed only
the right to attend criminal trials, this decision began a revolution
in access analysis and had a tremendous impact on all decisions
relating to the rights of the press and public to obtain information
from judicial proceedings. The plurality opinion, written by Chief
Justice Burger,58 focused on the historical foundation that influ-
enced the drafters of the Constitution in enacting the first amend-
ment.59 Specifically, the Chief Justice stressed the traditional pre-
sumption of openness that marked the history of the common
law.60 The Chief Justice noted that the right to attend criminal
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment l and
plays a critical role in ensuring that the enumerated freedoms of
the first amendment, which are designed to protect free communi-
cation about government, maintain their meaning.6 2 Similarly, the
Chief Justice emphasized that open criminal trials serve a thera-
peutic purpose by allowing society to see its criminal laws in
operation.6 3
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion offered a structural,
rather than an historical, justification for the first amendment
right of access to criminal trials.6 4 According to Justice Brennan,
open discussion about the operation of our criminal system was vi-
peal. Id. at 562.
57. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81.
58. Justices Stevens and White joined the Chief Justice's plurality opinion, id. at 558,
although both wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Stevens found that the decision
implied the existence of a first amendment right of access to other important government
information. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice White noted that the sixth amend-
ment was the proper source for the open trial rule. Id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, who wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, set forth a
similar argument. Id. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)). The Justices, however, were able to concur in the first
amendment decision as a secondary position. Id. at 581-82, 604.
Justice Powell did not participate in the Court's decision. Id. at 581. In Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), however, Justice Powell had found a first amendment
right of access to pretrial proceedings. Id. at 397-98. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the
ground that nothing in the Constitution could be read to overturn state court decisions
regarding closure. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 606.
59. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71, 577-80 (plurality opinion of Burger,
C.J.). According to the Chief Justice, the Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of
open trial proceedings. Id. at 577-80. The Chief Justice noted that this traditional common
law right applied to both civil and criminal trials. Id. at 580 n.17.
60. Id. at 565-73. The Chief Justice viewed the common law history of open courtroom
proceedings as "unbroken" and "uncontradicted." Id. at 573.
61. Id. at 580.
62. Id. at 576-77.
63. Id. at 570-73.
64. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tal in "securing and fostering our republican system of self-govern-
ment. '65 Justice Brennan argued that the dissemination of infor-
mation concerning criminal trials was necessary to promote
meaningful and informed discussion about government.6 From
this reasoning, Justice Brennan suggested two guidelines for deter-
mining whether the first amendment protects a particular right of
access.6 7 First, the claim of access must enjoy a foundation in the
traditions of self-governance.6 s Second, the right of access must
play a particularly significant role in the judicial process and in
government as a whole.69 In this instance Justice Brennan con-
cluded that a long tradition of openness in criminal trials existed"
and that this openness afforded the public an opportunity to ob-
serve and evaluate the administration of our criminal laws.71
Although unanimous in concluding that the first amendment
right of access was not absolute,7 2 none of the opinions in Rich-
mond Newspaper offered a clear standard by which to determine
what circumstances constitutionally justify closing a trial.7 3 In
65. Id.
66. Justice Brennan relied in part on Professor A. Meiklejohn for development of this
structural theory. Id.; see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONS TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1948); see also Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979) (explaining
structural model of first amendment).
67. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588-89. Justice Brennan referred to these
guidelines as "helpful principles" because the "judicial task is as much a matter of sensitiv-
ity to practical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning." Id. at 588; see also Globe Newspa-
per, 457 U.S. at 605-06 (using same two principles to reach holding for majority opinion).
68. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
69. Id.
70. Justice Brennan found that "[t]radition, contemporaneous state practice, and this
Court's own decisions manifest a common understanding that '[a] trial is a public event.'"
Id. at 593 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
71. Justice Brennan listed other societal interests served by the open courtroom. The
open criminal trial checks abuse in the system and promotes public confidence. The open
trial also promotes accurate fact-finding and encourages unknown witnesses who may have
valuable information to come forward. 448 U.S. at 594-97.
72. Id. at 581 n.18. (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 598 n.24 (Brennan, J., con-
curring in judgment); id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
73. Id. at 581 n.18 (Burger, C. J., plurality opinion). The Chief Justice stated that an
"overriding interest" would be necessary to justify closure. Id. at 581. The Chief Justice
indicated that a trial judge may impose "reasonable limitations on access to a trial" in the
"interest of the fair administration of justice." Id. at 581 n.18. "[T]he question in a particu-
lar case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge ...
the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemorially associated with resort to public places." Id. (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)). The Chief Justice, however, failed to define the scope of "overrid-
ing interest," finding that closure was clearly unwarranted in this instance. The trial court
had failed to make adequate findings of fact to justify closure and had failed to consider the
available alternatives to closure. Id. at 580-81.
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Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court74 the Supreme
Court further defined the first amendment right to attend criminal
trials and discussed the circumstances under which a trial court
properly might order closure. Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan reiterated his structural argument in support of this first
amendment right.7 5 According to Justice Brennan, the first amend-
ment serves a strategic role in promoting the participation of the
public in "our republican system of self-government. 76 Conse-
quently, by guaranteeing the public a first amendment right of ac-
cess to criminal trials, courts ensure that the "constitutionally pro-
tected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an informed one."
77
Justice Brennan then reiterated his two-part test,78 noting that the
right to attend criminal trials is both firmly rooted in history" and
Justice Brennan refused to address the issue, arguing that the statute unconstitution-
ally gave the trial judge unlimited discretion. Id. at 598. In two footnotes, Justice Brennan
mentioned that the interest in protecting courtroom decorum and national defense secrets
may outweigh the presumption of openness. Id. at 598 nn.23, 24. Finally, Justice Stewart
noted that the trial judge has the authority to reasonably limit access to the courtroom by
the press and public. Id. at 600. According to Justice Stewart, these limitations need not be
constitutional to justify closure. Justice Stewart mentioned such exceptions as the preserva-
tion of trade secrets and the protection of youthful witnesses. Id. at 600 n.5.
74. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). The case arose when a trial court in Massachusetts denied the
local media access to a criminal trial concerning the rape of three minors. Id. at 598. The
lower court based its decision on a state statute that required the trial judge to ban access
by the press and public to the courtroom during testimony of rape victims under the age of
eighteen. Id. at 598-600; see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981). In this
instance, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court and held that the statute effected an unconstitutional infringement of the public's
right of access to attend criminal trials. Id. at 602, 610-11.
The Supreme Court had heard the Globe Newspaper case once before. The Court had
vacated an earlier judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that dismissed
the newspaper's appeal from the initial closure order. The Court remanded the case to allow
the lower court to reconsider its decision in light of Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555.
On remand, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again dismissed the suit, concluding
that the statute was constitutionally sound under the Richmond Newspapers standards.
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 600.
75. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604. Justice Brennan also emphasized the long tra-
dition of open trials under the common law. Id. at 605. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justice Rehnquist, accused the majority of ignoring "the weight of historical prac-
tice," noting that "[t]here is clearly a long history of exclusion of the public from trials
involving sexual assaults, particularly those against minors." Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). According to the Chief Justice, absent this historical openness, the Massachusetts
statute did not violate the first amendment. Id. at 614-16.
76. Id. at 604; see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
77. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
79. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605.
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serves a significant role in the functioning of the judicial process. °
The majority opinion then provided a standard of review for
future decisions concerning the right of access to criminal proceed-
ings. The Court asserted that even when a first amendment right
of access attaches, that right is not absolute."' This qualified right
of access may be overcome if a closure order is "necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. '8 2 In the instant case the Court found that the justi-
fication for the Massachusetts statute-the desire to protect young
rape victims from further trauma and embarrassment-did not
meet this test and, therefore, was unconstitutional.83
Although in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper the
Court discussed only the right to attend criminal trials, several
federal courts quickly expanded the Supreme Court's reasoning to
provide constitutional protection for access rights to pretrial sup-
pression hearings, entrapment hearings, and voir dire proceed-
ings.8 4 More significantly, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in Associated Press v. District Court,5 held
that the first amendment required that a court provide access to
pretrial documents filed in the highly publicized narcotics trial of
John Z. DeLorean. 6 To ensure that the court did not violate either
the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial or the pub-
lic's first amendment access right, 7 the trial judge placed all docu-
ments filed in the case under seal until the court could make an
adequate determination concerning the appropriateness of
80. Id. at 606.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 606-07.
83. Id. at 607-11. First, the Court found uncompelling Massachusetts' argument that
the statute was necessary to protect minor victims from trauma and embarrassment. Id. at
607-08. The Court emphasized the benefits of a case-by-case analysis over a mandatory clo-
sure order. Id. Second, the Court was unpersuaded by Massachusetts' argument that closed
trials encourage more victims to come forward and testify. Id. at 609-10. The state had
failed to support its position with any empirical evidence. Id. Furthermore, the trial court's
release of verbatim transcripts nullified the effect of closure.
84. See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982) (pretrial suppression, due
process, and entrapment hearings); United States v. Brooldier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982)
(voir dire proceeding).
85. 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983).
86. The authorities indicted DeLorean and two other defendants for violating federal
narcotics statutes. Id. at 1144.
87. Id. The authorities indicted the'defendants in October 1982. Between that time
and December 22, 1982, when the district court issued the closure order, the court allowed
the press and public to inspect the records and files of the court openly. Id.
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disclosure.8
On appeal,8 the Ninth Circuit directed the lower court to va-
cate its blanket closure order.90 The court held that the order vio-
lated the public's first amendment right to inspect criminal
records. 1 Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision,9 the court
found no reason to distinguish between a first amendment right of
access to documents filed in pretrial proceedings and the proceed-
ings themselves." The court found that the Globe Newspaper ra-
tionale, 94 which the Supreme Court had used to justify the first
amendment right to attend criminal trials, was equally applicable
to pretrial documents for two reasons. 5 First, the court noted the
common law history of allowing access to pretrial documents.96
Second, the court indicated that pretrial documents "are often im-
portant to a full understanding of the way in which 'the judicial
process and the government as a whole' are functioning. ' 97 The
court, therefore, concluded that filing a document under seal, re-
gardless of the length of time, impermissibly undermined the first
amendment presumption of access to criminal proceedings. 8
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Associated Press,
which concerned the right of access to documents used in a crimi-
88. Id.
89. The media requested that the court reconsider its blanket closure order, but the
district court denied the motion. Id. at 1145. The court left in effect its order that all docu-
ments be filed under seal. The court, however, modified the procedure for access to sealed
documents. The court allowed all parties, including the press, upon receipt of notice, to
make comments within forty-eight hours concerning the propriety of sealing specific docu-
ments to which the party desired access. Id. The Associated Press and several other news
organizations appealed. Id.
90. Id. at 1147.
91. Id. The Associated Press court was not the only court to reach this conclusion. In
1981 a federal district court, in United States v. Carpenter, 526 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982), held that the public had a first amendment right to
inspect evidence that a party had submitted in a public sentencing hearing. Id. at 294-95.
The court based this conclusion on what the court perceived as the growing trend exempli-
fied by Richmond Newspapers. Id.
92. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (enumerating the tests
for deciding whether the press and public have a right of access to criminal proceedings).
93. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
94. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605-06. For a discussion of the Globe Newspaper
rationale, see supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
95. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
96. Id. (relying on Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978)).
97. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606).
98. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1147; see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
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nal pretrial proceeding, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits considered the question of access to documents filed
in civil proceedings." Four of the circuit courts have adopted a
strong presumption in favor of access to civil court documents. 100
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits found the presumption
to be of constitutional magnitude. 10 1 According to these three
courts, only exceptional circumstances could justify a claim of con-
fidentiality.10 2 In each circuit the courts relied heavily on the Su-
preme Court's Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper deci-
sions as support for their holdings.103 The Third, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits did not hesitate to apply the standards
enunciated in the Supreme Court decisions regarding criminal pro-
ceedings to the civil setting.104 Only the D.C. Circuit held that the
press and the public do not have a first amendment right of access
to civil court records.1 0 5 This part of the Recent Development ex-
amines these decisions.
A. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,10 6 was the first cir-
cuit to address the right of access question in a civil proceeding.
The plaintiff brought suit to prevent the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (F.T.C.) from publishing damaging commercial information in
99. See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Wilson v. American Motors Corp. 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Continental
Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059
(3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). The Third Circuit's decision in Publicker Indus. is asso-
ciated primarily with the conclusion that the press enjoys a first amendment right of access
to civil trials. The decision, however, did discuss, and has a tremendous impact on, the
question of a constitutional right of access to civil court documents. This Recent Develop-
ment, therefore, will discuss Publicker Indus. together with the recent decisions that have
addressed specifically the issue of access to civil court documents.
100. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1308;
Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1070; Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1570.
101. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1178; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1314;
Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571.
102. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1314;
Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571.
103. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177-79; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at
1308-09; Publicker Indus., 735 F.2d at 1067-70; Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1569-71.
164. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1178-79; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1308-
09; Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1067-70.
105. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d at 1339.
106. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
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the Federal Register." 7 The district court dismissed the action, but
placed the administrative records and other documents filed by the
F.T.C. under seal pending appeal.108 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the lower court's decision to dismiss, but reversed the deci-
sion to place the documents under seal.109
In deciding to reverse the district court's order placing the
documents under seal, the court first determined the level of dis-
cretion to give to the lower court's decision. 110 Following Warner
Communications the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the trial
court had supervisory power over its own records and files, and
that appellate courts were to give considerable discretion to the
trial judge's decision concerning the right of access to these materi-
als."' The court, however, emphasized that the lower court's su-
pervisory power must be governed by standards."12 According to
the court, both the first amendment and common law limited the
trial court's discretion." s
In determining the appropriate standard of review for right of
access cases, the Sixth Circuit adopted Justice Brennan's two-part
test enunciated in the Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspa-
107. Id. at 1168-69. The F.T.C. operates a testing and reporting program designed to
determine the tar and nicotine level of cigarettes. Id. at 1168. The F.T.C. designed the test
to provide consumers with a means of comparing the many brands of cigarettes on the
market. Id. After a complaint from a competitor of Brown & Williamson, the F.T.C. reeval-
uated the testing procedure for Brown & Williamson's Barclay cigarette. Id. Because of its
unique filter system, which the knowledgeable smoker could render ineffective, the F.T.C.
made an announcement that Brown & Williamson could no longer rely on and disseminate
"misleading information" based on data from the old testing procedure. Id. The F.T.C. also
announced that it was going to run new tests on the Barclay cigarette. Id. at 1169. Finally,
the F.T.C. announced that it was going to publish this news in the Federal Register. Id. at
1168-69.
108. Id. at 1169.
109. Id. Concerning the seal, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue on the court's own
motive. A nonprofit consumer organization called The Public Citizen Health Research
Group filed a comprehensive amicus curiae brief. The Group's objective was to persuade the
Sixth Circuit to lift or modify the seal placed on the documents. The organization argued
that the Freedom of Information Act, the first amendment, and the common law gave the
public a right of access to the court records. According to the Sixth Circuit, Brown & Wil-
liamson "aptly defended" against this request for disclosure. Id.
110. Id. at 1177.
111. Id.
112. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that "the trial court's discretion is circumscribed by a
long-established legal tradition." Id. Citing John Locke, the court emphasized that "[t]he
English common law, the American constitutional system, and the concept of 'the consent of
the governed' stress the 'public' nature of legal principles and decisions." Id.; see J. LocKE,
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 124, 136-137 (1690).
113. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177.
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per decisions. 114 The court noted that, historically, both civil and
criminal trials have been presumptively open"15 and the court
found the open courtroom to be fundamental to the American ju-
dicial system. 1 6 The court also emphasized the functional benefits
derived from open court proceedings. 1 7 First, open proceedings
provide an outlet for community concerns and emotions." 8 Second,
open trials give the public a means of critiquing the judicial sys-
tem. 1 9 Last, public trials encourage the pursuit of truth and accu-
racy in the fact-finding process. 20 The court found these policy
considerations applicable to both civil and criminal cases because
just resolution of private disputes frequently involves issues in
which third parties and the general public have an interest.' 2 ' The
court, therefore, found that a strong presumption in favor of access
attached to judicial records used in civil proceedings. 122
As a last step of analysis, the Sixth Circuit examined counter-
vailing interests that might outweigh the strong presumption in
favor of access. 2 ' The court noted that time, place, and manner
restrictions, 2 " and content-based exceptions may provide a legiti-
mate means of protecting a party's desire for confidentiality. 25 In
the latter category, the court borrowed from Warner Communica-
tions, mentioning privacy rights of participants or third parties,
trade secrets, and national security as types of interests that might
preclude disclosure. 26 In the instant case the court refused to ac-
114. Id. at 1177-79; see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589-97; Globe Newspaper,
457 U.S. at 605-07.
115. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1169; see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
569 (recognizing that criminal trials have been presumptively open); see also Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (concluding that historical support for access to criminal
trials applies equally to civil trials).
116. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177.
117. Id. at 1178-79.
118. Id. at 1178.
119. Id. at 1178-79. "In either the civil or criminal courtroom, secrecy insulates the
participants, masking impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption." Id.
at 1179.
120. Id. at 1178-79.
121. Id. The court noted that the "community catharsis" is necessary at civil trials,
especially when involving such important public issues as discrimination, voting rights, anti-
trust issues, government regulation, and bankruptcy. Id. at 1179.
122. Id. The court, however, noted that this strong presumption is not absolute and
may be overcome by certain "distinct, but limited, common law exceptions." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. For the origin of the three-part test, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968).
125. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
126. Id.; see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598. In In re Knoxville News-Senti-
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cept the argument that the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in
protecting a trade secret. 12 7 The court believed that this argument
was really nothing more than an attempt to shield the company's
operation and protect the company's reputation. 128 For the court,
the mere assertion that this information qualified as a trade secret
was not enough. 29 Because other companies had access to the in-
formation, and because the plaintiff willingly submitted the re-
ports to the F.T.C., the court concluded that sealing of the docu-
ments was unjustified.130
B. In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation
In In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation3' the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of access to the de-
fendant corporation's special litigation committee report submitted
into evidence as part of a shareholder derivative suit.13 2 As the
Sixth Circuit did in Brown & Williamson,'3 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the public was entitled to the report. The court
reached this decision by examining the presumption of access to
civil court records and balancing this presumption against Conti-
nel Co., 723 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit applied this exception concerning the
privacy interest of third parties. In this instance the court allowed the bank to remove from
the court files documents containing personal financial records of the bank's customers. Id.
at 474, 476-78.
127. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180.
128. Id. at 1179-80; see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (holding that the report of a bank's special litigation committee, dis-
closure of which would supposedly affect the bank and community, should not be placed
under court seal).
129. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180.
130. Id. at 1180-81.
131. 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 1304, 1316. The shareholders of Continental Illinois Corporation brought a
derivative suit to compel the corporation to assert claims it may have had against third
parties. Continental established a special litigation committee ("SLC") to evaluate the
potential of each suit. The SLC, after conducting more than eighty interviews and reviewing
extensive paperwork assembled by Continental's previous counsel, submitted a 158 page
report consisting of a "full and candid discussion of all the SLC's significant factual find-
ings, its understanding of the applicable law, and its conclusions." Continental Ill., 732 F.2d
at 1305, (citing from Brief of Appellants at 8). The SLC's report determined that all but one
of the claims should be dismissed; Continental then sought approval of this decision from
the district court. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1304-05. Upon order of the district court,
Continental admitted the report of the SLC into evidence in connection with the motion to
terminate the claims. Id. at 1305. At these proceedings reporters requested access to the
report. The district court determined that because the court relied on the report in reaching
its decision, the newspapers were entitled to access to the SLC's findings. Continental
appealed. Id. at 1306-07.
133. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
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nental's interest in confidentiality.13 4 The court found that, histori-
cally, a strong presumption in favor of access to court records ap-
plied to both criminal and civil documents. 135 According to the
court, this presumption was of "constitutional magnitude."' 16 Sim-
ilarly, following Brown & Williamson, 37 the court had no difficulty
in applying this strong presumption to civil cases. Like the Sixth
Circuit, the court found that the policies considered in granting
access to civil proceedings should be the same as those considered
in criminal cases.'38 These policies included the public's right to
"monitor the functioning of [the] courts, thereby insuring quality,
honesty, and respect for [the] legal system.' 39
In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit addressed the
defendant's argument that the courts previously had not recog-
nized a right of access to pretrial proceedings in civil cases.14 0 The
defendant relied on a D.C. Circuit decision' 4 ' that interpreted
Warner Communications to mean that neither the first nor the
sixth amendment grants a constitutional right of access to judicial
records or evidence used at trial. 4 2 The Seventh Circuit claimed
that the D.C. Circuit had read Warner Communications too
broadly.143 According to the court, Warner Communications did
not imply a general denial of the right of access. 144 Rather, the Su-
preme Court merely had held that the press' constitutional right of
access was no greater than that of the public. 4 5 Refuting the de-
134. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1308-09.
135. Id. (quoting from United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978).
136. 732 F.2d at 1308; see United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (7th Cir.
1982); Associated Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
137. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
138. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1308.
139. Id.; see id. n.9.
140. Id. at 1309. Although the Seventh Circuit addressed the constitutional ramifica-
tions of Continental's argument in a footnote, the court based its holding on the status of
the motion to terminate. The court considered the motion to terminate equivalent to a
"'hybrid summary judgment motion."' Id. (citation omitted). Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). The Court, therefore, concluded that "the presumption of
access applie[d] to the hearings held and evidence introduced in connection with Continen-
tal's motion to terminate." Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1309.
141. Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
142. Id. at 1017; see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608-10; see also supra notes
20-34 and accompanying text for discussion of Warner Communications.
143. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1309 n.11.
144. Id. The court noted that the only right denied the press in Warner Communica-
tions was the right to copy the Watergate tapes. Id.
145. Id.; see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609.
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fendant's argument, the Seventh Circuit held that the presumption
of access applied to pretrial hearings and to evidence introduced in
connection with those hearings. 146
After determining that a strong presumption in favor of access
attached to civil court records, the court balanced this presump-
tion against the defendant's interest in confidentiality. 147 The de-
fendant argued that the attorney-client privilege, work-product im-
munity, effective functioning of special litigation committees, and
maintenance of high standards of accountability and confidence in
the banking industry were valid reasons to prevent disclosure. 14
The court disagreed,' 4 9 asserting that only under exceptional cir-
cumstances could a court refuse disclosure for material used in ac-
tual adjudication.' 50 The Seventh Circuit found that when courts
have relied on documents as part of the decision-making process, a
strong presumption arises that the party who admits the docu-
ments has surrendered the right to confidentiality of information
relating to matters of public interest.' 5'
C. Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen 52 the Third Circuit re-
versed a district court decision to seal sensitive documents filed in
146. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1309.
147. Id. at 1313.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1314; see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983). In Joy v. North the Second Circuit reversed a district court decision
to seal a special litigation report used in the adjudication stages of a derivative action. 692
F.2d at 894. The court noted that only "the most compelling reasons" could justify sealing
this type of document because the district court had relied on the report in making its
decision to dismiss the action. Id. at 893. Despite this strong language, the Second Circuit
based its decision to reverse on the common law presumption of openness. The court, how-
ever, did indicate that the sealing of such documents may "create serious constitutional
issues." Id.
150. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1315.
151. Id. at 1314-16. In Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983), the Second Circuit held that the party had waived the attorney-client privilege
and work product immunity by submitting the special litigation report as evidence for the
motion to dismiss. 692 F.2d at 894. In general, courts will honor these privileges only when
the party seeking to prevent disclosure has maintained the confidentiality of the materials.
See Periman Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
American Tel. and Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit, in
this instance, found it unnecessary to decide whether Continental had waived these privi-
leges, but noted that "[tihere [was] little interest in the confidentiality of documents which
[had] been publicly discussed by their custodian." Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1314.
152. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
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litigation concerning the control of the plaintiff corporation. 153 The
court held that both the first amendment and common law secure
for the public and press a right of access to civil trials and judicial
records.154 Concluding first that the media had a common law right
of access to the desired information,155 the court concentrated on
first amendment issues to reach its holding. Following closely Jus-
tice Brennan's reasoning in Globe Newspaper,1 56 the Third Circuit
set forth an extensive historical 5"7 and structural' framework in
153. As part of the litigation, one of the parties presented to the district court sensi-
tive information concerning the operation of a foreign subsidiary of the plaintiff. Id. The
plaintiff's subsidiary had been using an enzyme in the production of scotch whiskey to help
in the aging process. The plaintiff, however, had failed "to get approval for the introduction
of the enzyme from Customs and Excise as required by the English Company Finance Act."
Id. at 1064-65. The plaintiff desired to keep this information from its stockholders and the
general public. Id. at 1063-65. Because the company illegally produced the whiskey, the
company would be required to pull the whiskey off the world market. Such action would
cause "irreparable financial loss to [the plaintiff] in the millions of dollars." Id. at 1065. The
court held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff would be required to disclose this
information to its stockholders at its annual meeting. Id. at 1063-64. At the hearing, on the
plaintiff's request, the trial judge excluded members of the local and national media from
the courtroom because of the sensitive nature of the information and because the future
confidentiality of this information was at issue before the court. Id. at 1063. The trial judge
considered himself in a no-win situation. Acknowledging the press' interest in access, the
trial court felt compelled to hinder disclosure to insure that the court's decision was of
value. To have allowed the press access would have rendered the court's decision moot. Id.
Pending a final decision on the issue of confidentiality, the trial judge sealed the transcript
containing reference to the sensitive information. Id. at 1063-64. The media appealed,
claiming that the trial court had violated their first amendment and common law rights of
access to the civil trial and judicial records. Id. at 1064. The media also claimed that the
trial court violated their due process rights. Id. at 1061, 1064.
154. Id. at 1064.
155. Id. at 1066. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)
(acknowledging that the existence of a common law right of access to judicial proceedings
and to inspect judicial records is beyond dispute). The court had no difficulty applying this
common law presumption to the civil courtroom. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1066-67; see
also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 386 n.15 (holding constitutional right to de-
mand a public trial is equally applicable to civil and criminal cases).
156. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1067.
157. The court quoted English legal historians, including Coke, Hale, Jencks, and
Blackstone, to support the proposition that both criminal and civil trials traditionally have
been open to the public under the common law. Id. at 1068-69; see 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103 (6th ed. 1681); M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENG-
LAND 163 (C. Gray ed. 1971); E. JENCKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967);
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 (1773). The court also
noted numerous statements from recent Supreme Court decisions indicating that under
American tradition both criminal and civil trials presumptively have been open. Publicker
Indus., 733 F.2d at 1068-69; see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (Burger, C.J.)
(plurality opinion); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 386 n.15; see also Warner Communications, 435
U.S. at 597 (recognizing a general right to inspect and copy judicial records).
158. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1070. The court stated:
From these authorities we conclude that public access to civil trials "enhances the
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support of the first amendment right of access to civil trials. The
court emphasized that the public right of access to civil trials is
fundamental to the democratic form of government. 159 According
to the Third Circuit, public access to civil trials is crucial to guar-
antee free and informed discussion of governmental affairs. 60
Having found a first amendment right of access to civil court
trials, the Third Circuit proceeded to formulate the appropriate
standard of review.16' The court acknowledged that the first
amendment right was not absolute, yet noted that, as with other
fundamental rights, the right of access to civil trials deserved a
strict standard of scrutiny.'62 To limit the public's right of access
to civil trials, therefore, the party opposing disclosure must show
"that the denial serves an important governmental interest and
that there is no less restrictive way to serve that governmental in-
terest.' ' 6 3 In the immediate case, because the trial court neither
articulated an overriding interest for sealing the transcripts nor
considered whether a less restrictive means could keep the infor-
mation from the public, the Third Circuit concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion. 64
Although the court's decision did not reach the merits of the
access question, the court pointed out that this case did not con-
cern the type of commercially sensitive information typically enti-
tled to protection from disclosure. 6 5 This case, the court noted,
simply concerned a matter of poor management.' 66 The interest of
investors in preventing financial loss and the interest of manage-
quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact-finding process." Access "fosters an
appearance of fairness," and heightens "public respect for the judicial process." It
"permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an
essential component in our structure of self-government." Public access to civil trials,
no less than criminal trials, plays an important role in the participation and the free
discussion of governmental affairs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
159. Id. at 1069.
160. Id. at 1070; see also Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177-79 (embracing first
amendment right to civil trial to insure informed discussion of governmental affairs).
161. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1070.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07; see also Brown & Williamson, 710
F.2d at 1177-79 (holding that only exceptional circumstances warrant closing court records).
164. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1079.
165. Id.; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890
n.42 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (listing cases in which business information was protected).
166. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1074. "[P]otential harm . . . in disclosure of poor
management in the past. . .is hardly a trade secret." Id. (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 894 (2nd Cir. 1982)).
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ment in avoiding embarrassment did not overcome the presump-
tion of openness supported by the public interest in being pro-
tected from bad business practices. 1
67
D. Wilson v. American Motors Corp.
In Wilson v. American Motors Corp. e5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a
plaintiff should be permitted access to sealed records from an ear-
lier federal court case involving the same defendant." 9 The court
divided its opinion into two parts on the basis of the evidence
sought by plaintiffs. The first part concerned the earlier court's
"record of the proceedings.' °70 The record consisted of the plead-
ings, docket entries, orders, filed depositions or affidavits, and the
transcripts from the hearings and court proceedings. 71 The second
part concerned the exhibits that the parties had offered at trial.
17 2
The court made this distinction because of the earlier Belo Broad-
casting73 opinion in which the Fifth Circuit had held that "the
Constitution grants neither press nor public the right to physical
access to courtroom exhibits.'17  Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to access to the trial
exhibits. 17 5
167. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1074.
168. 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985).
169. The initial case, also styled Wilson v. American Motors Corp., concerned a
wrongful death claim arising from an accident involving an American Motors jeep. 759 F.2d
at 1569. The initial Wilson case was settled. The parties reached an agreement, with the
encouragement and assistance of the trial judge, following the jury's response to special
interrogatories. Id. The plaintiff wanted the information to invoke offensive collateral estop-
pel in her state court action against the defendant. The state court suit, Decker v. American
Motors Corp., No. 474278, Superior Court of San Diego County, State of California, was also
a wrongful death action arising from an American Motors jeep accident. Id. The federal
district court denied the plaintiff's request for the documents, stating that in the defend-
ant's earlier case, the court had sealed the records as an integral part of the negotiated
settlement between the parties. Id. The Eleventh Circuit assumed that had the court been
unwilling to seal the documents, the parties never would have agreed to settlement. Id.
170. Id. at 1569.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981). The court consid-
ered Belo Broadcasting to be binding under the Eleventh Circuit opinion that adopted all
previous Fifth Circuit opinions as binding precedent. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (asserting that Eleventh Circuit adopts Fifth Circuit prece-
dent prior to October 1, 1981).
174. 759 F.2d at 1570 (emphasis in original); see Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 428
(discussed supra at notes 44-50 and accompanying text).
175. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1572.
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Concerning access to the record of the proceedings, the court
found no binding precedent. Addressing a potential constitutional
source for the right of access, the court noted that the Supreme
Court had not yet decided whether the press and the public enjoy
a constitutional right to attend civil trials.17 16 The court was aware
that the Third and Sixth Circuits had found a constitutional right
of access to documents filed in civil proceedings,' 7 but because of
the lack of clear guidance, the court avoided the constitutional
question and focused instead on the common law right of access. 1 8
The court decided that a common law right of access indispu-
tably exists with respect to civil proceedings. 79 According to the
court, under a common law analysis courts use an abuse of discre-
tion standard on review.8 0 The court indicated, however, that the
common law presumption of open proceedings was not determina-
tive in this case because different courts had taken different ap-
proaches to the question of access to records of court proceed-
ings.1 8' After articulating the various approaches courts had taken
on the access question, the court relied on an earlier Eleventh Cir-
cuit case and adopted a compelling interest test.82 Although the
court asserted that not every hearing, deposition, conference, or
trial need be open, the court required that closure be necessitated
by a "compelling governmental interest, and [be] narrowly tailored
to that interest."' 83 Applying the newly articulated standard to this
case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendant's desire to
prevent the plaintiff from using the sealed information in the later
suit was inadequate justification for sealing the court's records.184
176. Id. at 1569.
177. Id. at 1569-70 (referring to Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1071, and Brown &
Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1178-79).
178. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1570.
179. Id. (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ("What transpires in the court-
room is public property.")); see Newman v. Graddich, 696 F.2d 796, 803 (11th Cir. 1983).
180. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1570.
181. Id. See In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra notes 35-39 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Myers; see also Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 434 (re-
jecting the overwhelming presumption of openness). For a discussion of Belo Broadcasting,
see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 1571; see Newman, 696 F.2d at 802.
183. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571. The court adopted the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606-07. According to the court, this stan-
dard was less stringent than the standard the Sixth Circuit adopted in Brown & Williamson
and the standard the Fifth Circuit condemned in Belo Broadcasting. Wilson, 759 F.2d at
1570-71.
184. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571. According to the court, the litigants in the first trial in
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E. In re The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
The D.C. Circuit, in In re The Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press,185 considered whether the district court had vio-
lated the press' and the public's first amendment rights of access
to civil court records by delaying until after trial the right to ex-
amine documents submitted as part of the trial. 8" The D.C. Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court decision, holding that neither the
press nor the public has a first amendment right of access to court
records prior to judgment. 87
The D.C. Circuit began its constitutional analysis by consider-
ing Supreme Court precedent. The court noted that the Supreme
Court had not yet decided whether the first amendment provided
the public a right of access to court records in civil cases. 8 ' Ac-
cording to the court, the Supreme Court only recently had found
in the first amendment a right to observe criminal proceedings. 89
The court indicated that, although the contours of this constitu-
tional right were being elaborated on, "the [right] has not yet been
applied to access to civil trials, much less to access to records in
federal court had no right to agree to seal what were actually public records. The Eleventh
Circuit reminded the district court to "keep in mind the rights of a third party-the public,
'if the public is to appreciate fully the often significant events at issue in public litigation
and the workings of the legal system.'" Id. (quoting Newman, 696 F.2d at 803).
185. 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
186. Id. at 1325-26. In Reporters Committee Mobil Oil Company, a party to a compli-
cated libel and slander suit, requested and received a protective order covering documents
transferred during discovery. Id. at 1326. The district court entered the first protective
order on November 1, 1981, on the basis of an affidavit filed by Mobil's vice-president. The
affidavit described the adverse effects the material's release would have on Mobil's competi-
tive standing. The affidavit also indicated that practical difficulties would arise in going
through the documents one-by-one to determine which documents contained sensitive infor-
mation. Id. Later, after the trial court had denied each of the parties' summary judgment
motions, which contained a number of documents that had been labeled confidential, Mobil
requested that the trial court continue the protective order through trial. Id. The district
court denied the summary judgment motions one week before trial. See Tavoulareas v. Piro,
Nos. 82-1820, 82-1821 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1982) (order). The trial court granted this request.
Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1327. At trial, the media moved to intervene and
requested that the trial court reconsider its earlier protective orders. The trial court granted
the reporters' motion to intervene, but-refused-to-lift the seal from the confidential records.
The trial court, however, did agree to reevaluate the need for the seal at the close of the
trial. Id. The reporters appealed, raising only the constitutional argument that the first
amendment required the court to grant the media access. Id. at 1326. The court, therefore,
did not consider whether a common law right of access existed. Id. at 1330. But see id. at
1342 (Wright, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for not considering common law right
of access).
187. 773 F.2d at 1325.
188. Id. at 1330-31.
189. Id. at 1331 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575).
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civil trials-or, for that matter, even records in criminal trials."190
The court indicated that the two Supreme Court cases that
have considered rights of access to court records were not relevant
to the instant case. First, the court indicated that Warner Commu-
nications was of little practical help because the Supreme Court
had not considered whether the public possessed a first amend-
ment right of access to the tapes.19 According to the D.C. Circuit,
the Supreme Court's decision in Warner Communications was de-
terminative only of the press' constitutional and common law
rights of access. 192 Second, the court indicated that the recent Se-
attle Times v. Rhinehart'9 3 decision had limited application to the
instant case because in Seattle Times the Court discussed a liti-
gant's constitutional right to disseminate information.'94 Similarly
problematic, the information the newspaper sought to disseminate
had not yet been filed with the court nor introduced into
evidence.195
Despite the lack of directly applicable Supreme Court prece-
dent, the court undertook a constitutional analysis based on the
general guidelines developed in the Supreme Court's earlier access
cases.'96 The court began by examining the historical tradition of
public access to court records.'97 Quoting extensively from Warner
Communications, the court initially concluded that a tradition of
public access to judicial documents existed, but that this right was
not absolute.'9 8 The court then considered whether this tradition
included "pre-judgment access" and concluded that, based on the
historical evidence, no common law right of access to court records
existed prior to judgment.199 The court gave three reasons for this
conclusion. First, the court examined several nineteenth century
cases which seemed to indicate that, under the common law, no
right of public access attached to prejudgment records in civil
190. 773 F.2d at 1331.
191. Id. at 1331.
192. Id.; see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608-10. The court, however, did
note that "[p]resumably the Court believed it was constitutional that the public had been
denied access" because of the Court's "finding of no common law right of access." Reporters
Committee, 773 F.2d at 1331 (emphasis in original).
193. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
194. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1331-32; see Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32-33.
195. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1332; see Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33.
196. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
two-part approach to access questions).
197. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1332.
198. Id. at 1332-33.
199. Id. at 1333-36.
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cases. 20 0 Second, the court noted the "natural connection" between
the policy of nonaccess and the well-established common law
"public records privilege."'20 1 The public records privilege did not
extend to "'accusations contained in papers filed by a party and
not yet brought before a judge or magistrate for official action.' -1202
Last, the court indicated that modern courts' practice of announc-
ing a public right of access to civil cases without making the pre-
judgment/postjudgment distinction does not constitute "an his-
toric practice of such clarity . . as to justify the pronouncement
of a constitutional rule preventing federal courts and the states
from treating the records of private civil actions as private matters
until trial or judgment." 208
The court also undertook a functional analysis. The court be-
gan by listing the reasons the Supreme Court had given for open-
ing criminal trials to the public.20 4 The D.C. Circuit determined
that the those reasons were not as relevant when considering ac-
cess to civil proceedings between private parties.20 5 The court then
noted that prejudgment access to documents did not promote the
purposes of open trials.206 According to the court, third parties
rarely request access to trial documents; consequently, denial of
access to these documents rarely provokes the outcry associated
with closing the trial itself.20 7 As a result, the court concluded that
the lower court had acted properly in sealing the documents until
after the close of trial.208
The dissent in Reporter's Committee disagreed with the ma-
jority's approach regarding the right of access to trial exhibits. 20 9
According to the dissent, both the common law and the first
amendment guarantee the press and the public a contemporaneous
200. Id. at 1333-34.
201. Id. at 1335. The "public records privilege" refers to the privilege against liability
for defamation in the accurate reporting of public records. Id.
202. Id. at 1335. (quoting Stanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156,
158 61 N.E.2d 5, 6 (1945)). According to the court, "it would be strange, if not unthinkable,
to assess civil liability for bringing to the public's attention government records which the
public is entitled to see." Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1335 (citing Cowley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392, 396 (1884).
203. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1336 (emphasis in original).
204. Id. at 1336-37.
205. Id. at 1337.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1325, 1341 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent concurred with the major-
ity's opinion with respect to the documents the district court considered in denying the
summary judgment motion. Id.
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right of access to evidentiary exhibits in civil proceedings. 1 ' The
dissent accused the majority of opening the door to abuses of con-
fidential seals, 11 fearing that litigants, on the basis of summary
affidavits, could "make broad, unsubstantiated, claims of confiden-
tiality and prevent public access to critical evidentiary exhibits un-
til public interest in such documents ha[d] long faded. 21 2 The dis-
sent emphasized the importance of timing and acknowledged the
"contemporaneous" nature of the right of access. 213 The dissent be-
lieved this contemporaneous right of access demanded, "at a mini-
mum," that a party seeking a seal produce a document-by-docu-
ment need for the seal. 14 In an historical analysis, 5 the dissent
concluded that "a review of the common law precedent suggests a
presumptive right of contemporaneous access to the records of civil
proceedings."21' To the degree that the common law limited the
time at which such access might occur, common law courts have
"shown a preference for access at the time the trial began, not at
the time judgment was issued. 217 The dissent began its functional
analysis by listing the benefits of open trials. Relying on the few
Supreme Court cases that have addressed the issue in the criminal
context, the dissent stated that open trials (1) "enhance the qual-
ity of fact finding," (2) "assume the appearance of fairness," (3)
"play a cathartic role in permitting the community to observe jus-
tice being done," and (4) legitimize judicial proceedings.21 8 The
dissent expressly aligned itself with those circuits which have held
that these functional arguments apply equally well to civil pro-
ceedings and to evidentiary exhibits.21"9 Finally, the dissent dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the public can learn of
the subtleties of the exhibits through a postjudgment investigation.
According to the dissent, such an approach suppresses important
news through delay.220
210. Id. at 1342.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. n.3.
214. Id. at 1344 (emphasis in original).
215. Id. at 1347. The dissent undertook an historical analysis only after criticizing the
majority for placing considerable emphasis on the historical practice of the courts. Accord-
ing to the dissent, the most recent court decisions have come to rely almost entirely on
functional arguments for determining the scope of the right of access.
216. Id. at 1347-51.
217. Id. at 1351.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1353. The dissent then established its own standard, recognizing that the
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IV. ANALYSIS
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Richmond Newspapers
and Globe Newspaper, courts generally have accepted the exis-
tence of a first amendment right to attend civil trials.221 Courts,
however, still dispute both the existence and scope of a first
amendment right of access to documents filed in civil proceedings.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have stated that the first amend-
ment does grant the press and the public a contemporaneous right
of access to court records and have indicated that this right
attaches to all records submitted for judicial consideration.222 The
Eleventh Circuit has concluded that the first amendment does not
mandate the disclosure of trial exhibits, but that a constitutional
presumption of openness applies to all other court records.223 The
D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the first amendment
does not grant to the press and the public a right of access to judi-
cial records prior to final determination of the case on the mer-
its.224 The first section of this Analysis argues that a first amend-
ment right of access to court records is inappropriate in light of
current constitutional theory. The second section of the Analysis
suggests a common law balancing test for courts to apply when
considering a right of access question.
A. The Constitutional Right of Access
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed directly the
issue of access to civil court documents, lower courts have extrapo-
lated various conclusions from Warner Communications. Initially,
first amendment generally requires a test of strict scrutiny. The dissent, however, argued
that in evaluating a provisional seal a court need only use an intermediate level of scrutiny.
The dissent would "require only that the trial court establish (a) that the provisional seal
was justified by a substantial government interest, and (b) that there was no less restrictive
means of achieving that interest." Finally, the dissent indicated that the government's
interest in closure must be unrelated both to the content of the documents and the conse-
quences of disclosure. Id. at 1353-55.
221. See supra notes 56-83 and accompanying text; see also Newman v. Graddick, 696
F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond News-
papers and Beyond, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415 (1981); Note, After Richmond Newspa-
pers: A Public Right to Attend Civil Trials?, 4 Comm/ENT L.J. 291 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
After Richmond Newspapers]; Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials
After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 286 (1984) [hereinafter
Note, The First Amendment Right].
222. See supra notes 106-51 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 168-84 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
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the majority of courts and commentators construed Warner Com-
munications broadly, finding that the Supreme Court expressly
had denied a first amendment right to inspect and copy judicial
records. 25 More recently, courts have adopted a narrow approach,
arguing that the Supreme Court's disposition of Warner Commu-
nications did not constitute a general denial of the right of access
to judicial records.22 6 According to these courts, Warner Communi-
cations held only that the press' constitutional right of access was
not superior to that of the public. 7 Although these more recent
interpretations of Warner Communications are technically cor-
rect-the Court did not expressly deny a first amendment right of
access to judicial records-these decisions fail to recognize that the
first amendment right of access question was not at issue before
the Court.
More importantly, extrapolating a constitutional right of ac-
cess from Warner Communications misinterprets the opinion. The
Supreme Court did not even hint that a constitutional right of ac-
cess exists. On the contrary, the Court gave every indication that
the common law presumption in favor of access is not of constitu-
tional magnitude. First, the Court listed several exceptions to the
right to inspect and copy judicial records, exceptions that would
not stand up under a strict standard of review. 228 Interestingly, no-
where in the opinion did the Court mention the necessity of find-
ing a compelling interest before concluding that the party seeking
confidentiality has overcome the presumption of access. Rather,
the Supreme Court indicated that the presumptiom is just one fac-
tor to be considered in the media's favor.22 9 The Court mentioned
numerous privacy concerns as exceptions. For instance, courts are
not to allow access to information that would promote public scan-
dal, embarrass or discomfort divorce litigants, or serve as a
225. See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423,
426-29 (5th Cir. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866,
913-14 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Note, supra note 13, at 329-43; Note, supra note 11, at 686-
92.
226. See Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1309 n.11; Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145; In
re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Product Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34,
42 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
227. Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1309 n.11. These courts contend that the only
"right" the Supreme Court denied was the right to make copies of the tapes. The Court
allowed the press to listen to the tapes, read and publish the transcripts of the tapes, and
make comments about the tapes to the general public. Id.
228. Id.; see supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
229. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598.
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"reservoi[r] of libelous statements for press consumption. 2 30
Second, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the trial
court's discretion.23 The Court gave no indication that the trial
judge's discretion in closing the court records is limited to ex-
traordinary circumstances. Rather, the Court stated that the trial
court must weigh all the factors in light of "the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case. '23 2 Last, many of the cases
cited by the Supreme Court in its discussion of the common law
suggest that material disclosed in the litigation process may not be
presumptively open, particularly in civil trials.2 3 3 For these rea-
sons, any reliance on Warner Communications as support for a
constitutional right of access is clearly misplaced. A complete anal-
ysis of this issue, however, must distinguish between pretrial
records and trial exhibits.
1. Pretrial Records
When conducting a first amendment anBalysis, courts generally
determine whether the item of interest was historically available to
the press and public. 2 4 As Warner Communications clearly states,
the courts of this country have long recognized a general right to
inspect and copy judicial records. 235 The Court in Warner Commu-
nications lists numerous nineteenth and twentieth century cases as
authority for this proposition.23 Interestingly, an examination of
these cases, and other early cases, reveals that the presumption of
access to court records does not apply to pretrial documents.3 7 As
one commentator concluded, "the cases cited by the Court in
Nixon v. Warner Communications confirm the general under-
standing . . . that pretrial proceedings are analytically distinct
from actual trial proceedings for purposes of public disclosure and
that material disclosed in private litigation, even if filed in court, is
not presumptively public. '2 38
230. Id.
231. Id. at 599.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
235. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3rd Cir. 1984); see Warner
Communications, 435 U.S. at 597.
236. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1069; see Warner Communications, 433 U.S. at 597.
237. Id.; see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
238. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
33 n.136 (1983). For example, in Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1, 5-6, 48 N.W. 201, 202
(1891), cited in Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598, the Michigan Supreme Court
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Strong functional reasons explain why pretrial records histori-
cally have not been open to the public when the records have not
been instrumental in a ruling that may be appealed. Courts are
interested in maintaining the integrity of their records and pro-
tecting private parties from unnecessary harm.23 9 Courts recognize
that pretrial pleadings often contain "scurrilous charges which, al-
though filed, may never come to hearing or trial. '24 0 One court has
pointed out that if pleadings can be published by anyone gaining
access to them, then a party could cause great damage simply by
filing pleadings containing false charges and having them pub-
lished.241 This fear is particularly well founded given that parties
often move for summary judgment as a pretext for public dissemi-
nation of discovery materials. 24 12 Finally, if a court opens to the
public all the material submitted with a motion for summary judg-
ment and that motion is subsequently denied, the court will have
precluded the opportunity for settlement of the case conditioned
on confidentiality.24 3
Those courts which have held that a presumptive right of ac-
cess to pretrial records exists and attaches to all documents sub-
mitted for judicial determination will contend that the foregoing
arguments confuse the consideration of the presumptive right itself
with the consideration of whether countervailing interests should
upheld a trial court ruling that denied a newspaper's request for access to the pleadings,
emphasizing that civil suits are private rather than public affairs. Similarly, in Cowley v.
Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1894), cited in Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598, Jus-
tice Holmes stated that, although an open courtroom is necessary to protect the public's
ability to oversee the judicial system, courts should not allow access to some written state-
ments because exposure of those statements does not aid public oversight of judicial admin-
istration. See also Burton v. Reynolds, 110 Mich. 354, 355-56, 68 N.W. 217, 217 (1896) (stat-
ing that "it is not the absolute right of persons to make merchandise of the contents and
allegations contained in the records of private actions and suits").
With regard to documents that have not been filed with the court, the Supreme Court
recently has confirmed the pretrial document exception to the general access rule. Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). In Seattle Times the Supreme Court had to
decide whether the Constitution protected the defendant's right to disseminate information
transferred from the plaintiff during discovery. Id. The Court held that the Constitution did
not give the defendant this right, noting that "during the last 40 years in which the pretrial
processes have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone. . . that a pre-
trial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants."
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring), cited with
approval in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2208.
239. Schmedding, 85 Mich. at 4-6, 48 N.W. at 202.
240. Id.
241. Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 568, 40 N.W. 731, 734 (1888).
242. Marcus, supra note 238, at 49.
243. Id. & n.206 (discussing particular problems that arise in class action suits).
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overcome that right.24 These courts, stressing the need for con-
temporaneous review of judicial performance, will argue that only
by allowing access to all records prior to a final decision can the
public adequately assess the correctness of the judge's decision.245
This reasoning fails for two reasons. First, as the early decisions
implicitly recognized, drawing a distinction between the presump-
tion of openness and the countervailing interests is nearly impossi-
ble.246 A court, by determining that a first amendment or strong
common law presumption of access attaches to a pretrial record,
has pracatically destroyed any chance that a countervailing inter-
est will prevail because the countervailing interest must be of a
greater constitutional magnitude to outweigh the strong presump-
tion. 47 Second, by emphasizing the need for contemporaneous ac-
cess to trial documents, the press and public are often doing noth-
ing more than emphasizing that they are really interested in the
contents of the materials requested. The press can oversee the cor-
rectness of a decision just as well after a proceeding as during the
proceeding. Having the judge act as a screen does very little harm
to this ability in relation to the invaluable protection this service
affords the privacy and commercial interests of the litigants.
244. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179-80; Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litig., 101 F.R.D. at 43; see also Reporter's Committee, 773 F.2d at 1341-56 (Wright, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. See Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. at 43.
246. See, e.g., Schmedding, 85 Mich. at 3-4, 48 N.W. at 201-02; Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137
Mass. at 395.
247. The recent circuit court opinions in favor of access, by instituting a strict scrutiny
standard consistent with a first amendment right, have rendered meaningless any excep-
tions to the general rule in favor of access. These courts should realize that the qualified
nature of the tradition is as important as the general presumption of access. These courts
may argue that the courts are aware that the right of access to court records never has been
absolute and have acknowledged in their opinions that even the first amendment right to
inspect and copy judicial documents is not absolute. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 710
F.2d 1165; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d 1302; Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d 1059. Analyzing the
recent decisions reveals that this argument is seriously flawed. As the Eleventh Circuit
states in Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985), the courts
in favor of a first amendment right of access suggest that "the defendant's right to a fair
trial, certain privacy rights of participants or third parties, trade secrets and national secur-
ity, are virtually the only reasons which would justify total closure of public records." Id.
(referring specifically to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Brown & Williamson). Such a restric-
tive approach is not what courts and commentators have meant when they have indicated
that the general right of access is not absolute. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 27
& 55.
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2. Trial Exhibits
Unlike the dispute over access to pretrial records, the dispute
over access to trial exhibits focuses more on the nature of the right
of access than on the existence of a right of access. Although the
D.C. Circuit questioned whether a general right of access attaches
to trial exhibits prior to judgment,248 most courts have concluded
that a contemporaneous right of access attaches to all exhibits sub-
mitted in open court proceedings. 24 '9 The principal question is
whether this right of access is of a constitutional magnitude.
The right of access to documents filed with a court must play
a significant role in the functioning of the judicial process if courts
are to treat the right as constitutionally protected.250 Each of the
four recent circuit court opinions that permitted the press and the
public access to court records focused on this functional test in re-
lation to civil trialss51 These courts unanimously concluded that
public access to civil trials was appropriate because access en-
hanced the fact-finding process, fostered an appearance of fairness,
and served as a check on the judicial process.2 52 Arguably, good
reasons justify focusing on the functional test in relation to civil
trials when considering the presumption of access to civil court
documents. As the Sixth Circuit noted, "court records often pro-
vide important, sometimes the only, bases or explanations for a
court's decision. '253 As the Sixth Circuit opinion suggests, civil
courts might give greater effect to the policies underlying public
access to the courtroom when civil courts are subject to having
their court records opened for inspection.5 4
These reasons supporting the general right of the press and
public to inspect court records, although not entirely unpersuasive,
are inadequate to justify a first amendment right of access in civil
248. See Reporter's Committee, 773 F.2d at 1333-40.
249. See, e.g., Continental Ill., 732 F.2d 1302; Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d 1165.
250. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605-06.
251. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1178-79; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1308-09;
Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1067-71.
252. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1178-79; Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1308-09;
Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1067-71.
253. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177.
254. One commentator notes:
[Judicial records] reflect what the parties and the court wished to expose to public view
and afford an opportunity to analyze and authenticate the public's knowledge of its
judicial system. Without records, no information of practical use would exist to explain
why, after an extended period of time, a court acted in a particular fashion.
Note, supra note 13, at 343.
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cases. Unlike the open trial proceeding, access to civil court records
does not sufficiently serve desired societal and judicial interests. 55
First, the court's current access policies already satisfy the first
amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. If a partic-
ular document is relevant and probative on the issue at trial, the
parties concerned undoubtedly will reveal the information during
the trial proceeding. 56 Public access to documents, therefore,
would neither enhance the quality of, nor add to the integrity of, a
civil trial to any significant degree when the trial itself is com-
pletely open to the public.
Second, documents filed as part of the court proceeding gener-
ally are not critical to promoting an understanding of the trial.
Consequently, denying access to the documents does not hinder
the press from functioning in a meaningful fashion.257 Third, docu-
ments frequently may contain prejudicial and sensitive material
that a court may find inadmissible at trial as evidence. Public ac-
cess to these documents may mislead the public and compromise
the integrity of the trial.5 8 Similarly, the prospect of public access
might discourage the litigant from submitting relevant evidence for
fear of exposing other facts contained in a document.25
Fourth, public access to court documents increases the chance
that a party may not bring a suit or may be forced to settle a suit
for reasons unrelated to the merits of the case. Logically, the
greater the chance that a court will enable the press and public to
gain access to documents containing sensitive, irrelevant informa-
tion, the greater the chance a threatened party will avoid the em-
barrassing or harmful predicament litigation may pose. A potential
plaintiff may hesitate to bring suit, or a defendant may be unwill-
ing to fully litigate matters, if either believes that the opposition is
likely to uncover and submit for judicial consideration documents
that include sensitive and damaging, yet irrelevant, information
which the party wishes to keep private. In such a situation, the
press' and the public's rights of access greatly hinder, rather than
contribute to, the integrity and effectiveness of the judicial process.
Last, most of the arguments advanced against a constitutional
right of access to documents should be given even greater weight in
255. See generally United States v. DeLorean, 561 F. Supp. 797 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (re-
jecting constitutional right of access to judicial records).
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
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a civil suit than in a criminal one.260 In civil proceedings, the state
is rarely a party to the action; rather, mo~t civil suits concern pri-
vate disputes between private parties. Arguably, the public plays
less of a role in assuring the proper functioning of the courts in
civil cases. In a criminal trial, the defendant is involuntarily thrust
into a system in which he stands alone against the state. The sys-
tem then entrusts the press and public with serving the essential
function of assuring that the courts both administer justice and
protect the individual's liberties. In a civil suit, the parties have
chosen to bring their dispute before the court as a socially accept-
able alternative to other private means of dispute resolution. The
judiciary, by redressing wrongs and preventing undue hardships,
merely provides a necessary service that allows society to function
smoothly. Furthermore, the adversary system, an integral part of
the civil suit, acts to guard the integrity of the fact-finding process
and assure the fairness of the proceeding.
B. The Common Law Right of Access: A Balancing Approach
The foregoing analysis highlights the weaknesses of mechani-
cally determining that the right to examine court records is of a
constitutional magnitude. The arguments against finding a consti-
tutional right, however, do not condemn the existence of a common
law right to inspect and copy judicial documents. Indeed, this com-
mon law right has a strong historical basis161 and plays some role
in allowing the public to oversee the functioning of the judiciary.
The strength of this common law right, however, remains unclear.
As indicated by the Supreme Court in Warner Communica-
tions, under the common law approach access decisions should be
left to the trial judge. 62 This Recent Development argues that a
trial judge should use a simple balancing formula, based on factors
readily accessible to the court, in determining a third party's ac-
cess rights. Under this test a court should balance the interests of
the press and public to determine the strength of the presumption
of openness. Courts then should balance this presumption against
the competing interests of the litigants and the court. In weighing
the interests of the press and public, a court should consider: (1)
the public nature of the trial; (2) the type of information re-
quested-pretrial discovery documents or trial exhibits; and (3) if
260. See Note, After Richmond Newspapers: supra note 221, at 311-12.
261. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
262. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 599.
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a final determination has been made, the degree to which the trial
court relied on the information in reaching its decision. Having de-
termined the strength of the presumption of openness, the court
should consider: (1) the burden the request will impose on the
court and the litigants; and (2) the litigant's interest in closure.
1. The Presumption of Openness
The Supreme Court has indicated, and logic would dictate,
that the greater the public interest in a trial's outcome, the greater
the need for public access to the courtroom and the court's
records.2 "6 The first factor that courts should consider when deter-
mining the strength of the public's interest is the public nature of
the trial. Courts should examine three subfactors in this regard: (1)
the nature of the parties; (2) the nature of the cause of action; and
(3) the subject matter of the suit. The nature of the parties to the
civil proceeding is a crucial factor in determining whether the
courtroom should be open. For example, the court should be less
hesitant to open its records if one of the litigants is a government
agency or a prominent public figure than if both litigants are pri-
vate parties. The former instance is analogous to the criminal set-
ting, where the government's presence is a driving force behind the
trial proceedings and thus enhances the need for the press and
public to play a substantial role in assuring the proper functioning
of the court.64 In the latter instance, courts should be sensitive to
the privacy interests of private citizens. 65
As a second subfactor, courts should consider the nature of the
cause of action. Whether the action is in contract, tort, or brought
pursuant to a state or federal statute will affect the need for the
public to oversee the application of law. In a contract dispute, for
instance, the court will determine the outcome of the proceeding
based on an agreement between the parties. Generally, the court
should not have to look outside the parties' contract either to de-
termine if a cause of action exists or to resolve the dispute. Thus,
263. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 386-87; see also Brown & William-
son, 710 F.2d at 1180 (considering public interest in learning tar and nicotine content of
cigarettes as important factor in determining whether order to seal administrative docu-
ments filed at trial was constitutional); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d at 801-03 (noting
importance of public interest in overseeing penal administration); Petroleum Products Anti-
trust Litig., 101 F.R.D. at 38-39 (noting that public interest in oil crisis necessitated seal in
antitrust action).
264. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
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the public has little interest in overseeing the court's resolution of
the case. In a tort action, by contrast, the court must look to a
body of established law that exists apart from the parties and their
relationship, both to determine if a cause of action exists and to
redress the harm. The public, therefore, has a greater interest in
observing the law's application. Finally, with a federal or state
statute, the court is applying law that society has expressly created
and law in which society has a vested interest in seeing applied
properly.
As a last subfactor, courts should consider the subject matter
of the suit and the potential public impact of the court's decision.
Courts should be more inclined to allow access in a lawsuit seeking
to enjoin the destruction of a scenic limdmark or a suit seeking to
break up a large corporate merger than in a suit for a divorce. In
the former instances courts' records are less likely to be used to
gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.266 The courts
have long indicated that they will not let their records serve merely
as a means of satisfying curiosity or of facilitating the embarrass-
ment and humiliation of a person.
Next, courts should consider the type of information re-
quested when determining whether the court's records should be
open for inspection. The courts historically have made distinctions
between the parties' pretrial discovery documents and exhibits the
parties present as part of the actual trial."' Pretrial information,
even if filed in court, generally has not been open for public in-
spection.6 8 Courts should protect this type of information from
public disclosure because pretrial documents could contain sensi-
tive information about matters that may never come before the tri-
bunal.26 '9 Trial exhibits, on the other hand, deserve less protection
because they contain information relevant to the actual trial and,
therefore, are of greater interest to the public. Last, in determining
the strength of the presumption in favor of access, courts should
consider the degree to which the trial court relied on the requested
document in reaching its decision. Logically, the greater the reli-
266. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction
between pretrial and trial records.
268. See id.
269. See Schmedding, 85 Mich. at 4-6, 48 N.W. at 202. The courts, however, have
indicated, as common sense would dictate, that the presumption of access greatly increases
if the trial court makes a final determination at a pretrial ruling. See Continental Ill., 732
F.2d at 1314; Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 893.
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ance on the document, the greater the need for the press and pub-
lic to examine the evidence to gain an informed understanding of
the trial.
Given the liberal discovery mechanisms of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, courts in complex civil cases can find them-
selves flooded with thousands of documents. 7 0 Having the court
conduct a review concerning the confidential nature of each docu-
ment that the press or public requests, therefore, can place a great
burden on the court. Courts should consider this burden as a com-
peting interest in nondisclosure. Avoiding the time-consuming
chore of document-by-document review may be well justified, espe-
cially if the court believes that further proceedings will filter the
relevant information from the irrelevant documents.
2. The Litigant's Interest in Closure
Courts that have recently considered the right of access ques-
tion have offered very few examples of competing interests suffi-
cient to justify closing a trial proceeding or sealing a court's
records. Courts have recognized the protection of trade interests,' 71
the preservation of national security, 7 ' the protection of privacy
interests,273 and the attorney-client privilege27'4 as potential com-
peting interests in civil trials. Courts also have indicated that even
these interests will not support a categorical rule of closure.
Rather, the courts must consider each interest on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether the interest is sufficient to justify non-
disclosure. 5 As courts undertake a more thorough balancing ap-
proach and realize that the public's interest in a civil court docu-
ment may vary, courts should be more willing to give greater
weight to other competing interests.
A litigant's interest in withholding sensitive commercial infor-
270. See, e.g., Reporter's Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326 ("designat[ing] approximately
3,800 pages of deposition and an unspecified number of documents as confidential"); Zenith
Radio Corp.v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. at 873-74 (designating 100,000
pages of discovery documents as confidential); see generally Marcus, supra note 238, at 11
n.51 (listing cases with tremendous document loads).
271. See In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658. 661 (8th Cir.
1983); Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180.
272. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
273. See id; In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 1983).
274. See Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1313; Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616
F.2d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 1980).
275. See Continental Ill., 732 F.2d at 1313; Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179-80.
The courts consistently have placed the burden of persuasion on the party seeking closure.
See Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. at 43-44.
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mation is one competing factor courts should consider when a
third party requests documents. Sensitive commercial information
has enjoyed a long tradition of protection at common law.2 76
Courts often have protected commercial information that may not
be classified neatly as a trade secret-"the state of one's accounts,
the amount of his bid for a contract, his sources of supply, his
plans for expansion or retrenchment, and the like. '277 Similarly,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a litigant's inter-
est in confidential commercial information outweighs the presump-
tion of openness. 78 The courts have used this provision to protect
sensitive information from public disclosure in pretrial discov-
ery.2 79 Finally, Congress, when enacting its open access laws, ex-
pressed a willingness to protect a broad range of sensitive commer-
cial information.280 Courts should give similar consideration to
sensitive commercial information when balancing the interests at
issue in an access question.
The litigant's interest in privacy is also a factor in some access
determinations. The Supreme Court has held that the first amend-
ment protects certain privacy interests. 28 1 A party with a constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest should be protected from dis-
closure. The more important issue, therefore, concerns those
privacy interests that the Court has not deemed worthy of consti-
tutional protection.
Although at least one commentator has argued that a litigant
waives his privacy rights when he enters the courtroom, 282 the
276. See Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1018-19, for a thorough discussion of common law
protection of sensitive commercial information.
277. Id. at 1018 n.18 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 comment b (1939)). The
Restatement further provides: "there are no limitations as to the type of information
included except that it relate to matters [of one's] business." Id.
278. See FED. R Civ. P. 26(c)(7) (A court may order, upon a showing of good cause,
that "a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.").
279. Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1018 n.17 (citing Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren
Steurer & Assoc., 665 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Liberty Folder v. Curtiss Anthony Corp.,
90 F.R.D. 80, 82-3 (D. Ohio 1981).
280. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982) (allowing
agency not to disclose trade secrets and other confidential and financial information); Inter-
nal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982) (prohibiting disclosure of business information
given for tax collection purposes).
281. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (forbidding the use of contraceptive devices violated the right of marital
privacy).
282. See Note, The First Amendment Right, supra note 221, at 310.
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courts have not established such a principle. Rather, quite the con-
trary is true. As the Supreme Court noted in Warner Communica-
tions, courts historically have sought to prevent the disclosure of
embarrassing or humiliating information concerning a litigant in a
private lawsuit.2 83 Similarly, state legislatures have acknowledged
that in certain civil proceedings, such as divorce actions, juvenile
proceedings, will contests, or sensitive personal injury actions, the
parties may present particularly sensitive information that de-
mands recognition of the litigants' great privacy rights.84 These
legislatures have given courts mandatory guidelines or discretion-
ary power to exclude the press and public in these circum-
stances.2 s5 Courts, therefore, must use discretion in determining
when a litigant's right to privacy warrants protection from
disclosure.
A litigant's interests in privacy and commercially sensitive in-
formation should be taken seriously. Courts should look beyond
mechanical terminology, such as "trade secret," and consider the
harm disclosure will have on the litigant. Even when a given docu-
ment does not contain a trade secret or a constitutionally pro-
tected privacy concern, courts still should consider a litigant's le-
gitimate interest in nondisclosure when conducting the foregoing
balancing test. This balancing process best accommodates the in-
terests of the parties, the press, the public, and the system as a
whole.
V. CONCLUSION
This Recent Development argues that neither the press nor
the public have a first amendment right of access to judicial
records in civil proceedings. Rather, the press and public have only
a common law right of access to such records. The courts, there-
fore, are not bound by a standard of strict scrutiny when determin-
ing whether to close court records. Under the common law, courts
should conduct a balancing test that gives the trial court freedom
283. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598; see King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 284-85,
168 P. 730, 732 (1917); In re Caswell, 18 R. I. 835, 836, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893). But see Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that publication of names of rape
victims obtained from court records was not invasion of privacy). Note, After Richmond
Papers, supra note 221, at 312, citing In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 534, 34 P. 227, 230
(1893) (which rejected the view that humiliation and embarrassment of divorce litigants
warrant closure of courtroom).
284. Note, After Richmond Newspapers, supra note 221, at 312.
285. Id. at 318 (listing state statutes authorizing courts to close court proceedings).
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to weigh all the relevant factors in light of the facts and circum-
stances of a particular case. In undertaking the balancing test,
courts should weigh the common law presumption of open-
ness-the belief that the press and public play a role in overseeing
the function of the courts-against the litigants' interest in closure,
the public nature of the trial, the degree to which the request for
access will burden the court and the litigants, the type of records
being requested, and the state of the proceedings. This approach
attempts to implement the Supreme Court's only statement on the
issue, the Warner Communications decision, a decision that repre-
sents the most sensible approach to the question of access to judi-
cial documents.
Ronald D. May

